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In the Supreme G,ourl of the Slate of Utah 
UTAH FUNER,AL DIREtCTO·R.S & EMBALM-
ERS ASBOCIATl'ON, a Utah corporation, on 
behalf of its members, and UNION MO·RT·UARY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, on its own be-
half and on behaJlf of others ~similarly ,s.ituated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs.-
MEMORIAL GARDENS 0'F T'HE V ALLE,Y, 
INC., a Utah corporation; MEMORIAL TRUSTS, 
IN'C., a Utah corporation; LAKE HILLS, a Utah 
corporation; AULTOREST MEMORIAL :OOR-
POR~TION, a Utah corporation; HAL S. BEN-
N.ETT, D'ONALD HACKING AND R.AYM'O·ND 
W. GEE, members of the Business Regulation 
Commission of the State of Utah; and VIRGIL 
L. NORTON, Commi,ssioner orf Insurance of the 
State of Utah, 
Def erwlants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF D'EFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
MEMORIAL TRUSTS, IN'C. 
Case No. 
10236 
Since the primary target of this action was defend-
ant-respondent Memorial Trusts, Inc., herein called Me-
morial ·Trusts, this brief on its behalf will be directed pri-
marily to the controversy between that corporation and 
plaintiffs-appe·llants, herein called plaintiffs. 
NAT,URE OF THE CASE 
This was an action for declaratory judgment, in 
which plaintiffs asked the court to determine that the 
contracts of Memorial Trusts, for p-re-arranged funeral 
plans, and the conduct and practices utilized in the sale 
thereof, were illegal because they conflicted with appli-
cable Utah Statutes. 
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D'lS·POSIT'ION IN THE LOWER CO,URT 
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment, concluding that the facts failed to estab~ 
lish that the contracts in question were illegal or that the 
conduct and practices utilized in the sale thereof were in 
violation of law and, by its Amended Judgment of Dis-
missal (R. 44-48), the court granted defendants'·motion to 
dismiss the complaint. upon the. further ground that cer-
tain portions of the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan statutes, 
Title 22, Chapter 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1963 
Supplement) are unconstitutional. 
PRE.LIMINARY STAT·EMEN·T 
In plaintiffs' brief, each of the corporate defendants 
IS mistakenly pictured as engaging in essentially the 
same business conduct, dealing in essentially the same 
products ~nd services and offering prospective pur-
chasers essentially. the same pre-need contracts as are 
each of the others. However, a review of the contracts 
and practices o~ each readily -reveals their c?ssiinilarities. 
(R. 8, 12, 19-20, 35, 39·-41). 
Therefore, since the contracts and business practice& 
of Memorial ·Trusts differ in most respects from those. 
of the other corporate defendants, '\Ve outline in this State-
Inent of Facts the evidence as it applies to Memorial 
·Trusts only and upon '\\"hich the lo,ver court largely based 
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its Amended Judgment of Dismissal. No attempt will 
be made to discuss or compare the contracts or business 
practices of, or the law applicable to, the other corporate 
defendants. 
STATEME,NT OF FAC·TS 
Memorial ·T~rusts is a Utah corp·oration engaged in 
selling to the public, in advance of need, contracts for the 
furnishing of specified funeral and burial services and 
related items of personal p-roperty at fiXed and presently 
determinable prices which remain stable, regardless of 
future price increases in the industry. ~sale of its con-
tracts is made by means of advertising and personal con-
tact upon reference from person to person. Its contracts 
are not sold by door-to-door solicitation. (R. 17) 
Memorial :Trusts is not a funeral director or em-
balmer nor does it carry on any activities related to 
such professions. Rather, it merely agrees 
"to furnish a casket ... and to cause a completed 
funeral to to be conducted (regardless of future 
price increases) and including the articles of p-ro-
fessional services and facilities described [in the 
contract] below for the final rites of the funeral 
purchaser, such services to be performed by a 
mortuary selected by the Funeral Purhcaser ... " 
(R. 19, paragraph I). 
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Further, it is agreed between Memorial Trusts and the 
purchaser that 
"Memorial Trusts, Inc., as agent for the Fwneral 
Purchaser will make firm arrangements with 
a mortuary selected by the funeral purchaser. If 
a selected mortuary has not accepted the arrange-
ments before the time of the death of the Funeral 
Purchaser, or if the Funeral Purchaser's surviv-
ors use a mortuary other than one with which the 
firm arrangements have been made, then Memorial 
Trusts, Inc., may either make arrangements at 
the time of death with the mortuary used for like 
services or may furnish a casket of the quality de-
scribed (or refund Memorial ·Trusts' costs thereof) 
and refund the sum of $250.00 to the survivors. 
in lieu of the funeral services described above, 
or may refund all sums paid hereunder to the 
survivors." (Emphasis added.) (R.. 19, para-
graph V). 
With regard to payments made under the contract,. 
it is provided that 
"the funds to be paid hereunder and the net 
earning.s and gains, if any, thereon (altogether 
constituting the price of this agreement) shall be 
held and disposed of in accordance with the laws 
of Utah, from time to time in effect, which now 
provide that Memorial Trusts, Inc., shall deposit 
such funds as trustee \\yith a bank or trust com-
pany. The Funeral Purchaser hereby revocably 
appoints J\Iemorial :Trusts, Inc., as agent to de-
mand and receive earnings of the trust funds and 
to pay the sa1ne to itsPlf in exchange for and in 
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consideration of the agreement of Memorial 
Trusts Inc. to guarantee the services and facili-
' ' 0 ties above set forth regardless of future pr1ce 
increases. The Funeral Purchaser agrees upon 
request to make such demand personally and pay 
said earnings to Memorial Trusts, Inc. ( E.mpha.sis 
added.) (R. 19, paragraph IV). 
Memorial Trusts has made no claim that funds re-
ceived by it under its contracts are not subject to the 
entrusting provisions of the Utah pre-need law and it is 
conceded that all funds received by it are, in fact, placed 
in trust as provided by that law. (R. 35) 
IThe contract also provides that: 
"In the event of the death of the Funeral Pur-
chaser before the sums provided for herein are 
paid in full, Memorial Trusts, Inc., agrees to per-
form this agreement upon payment of the balance 
remaining due or supplemental arrangements 
made therefor." (R. 19, paragraph VI.) 
·The contract permits the purchaser to withdraw at 
any time all sums paid to Memorial Trusts under the 
contract, and thereby terminate all liabilities and o b1iga-
tions thereunder. (R. 19, paragraph VII). Further, even 
in case of a default in the payments, the purchaser, upon 
making a timely request, receives a credit in the amount 
paid toward funeral costs at a selected mortuary or to-
ward a new Memorial Agreement (R. 19, paragraph 
\TJJI). 
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The purpose and effect of the contract thus offered 
by Memorial 1Trusts is to permit the purchaser to make 
an unhurried, reasoned selection of the funeral and burial 
services and facilities which are to be used upon his 
death after having calmly taken into account his own 
desires, the prices to be paid and the effect upon his 
estate and upon his survivors of each of the various avail-
able altenatives. 
By making his own selection and his own arrange-
ments in advance of need, and by this means fixing the 
price in advance as well, a purchaser is able to spare his 
widow or other survivors many of the dreary and difficult 
tasks of arranging the numerous details of his funeral 
and burial. Further, and perhaps most important, a 
purchaser of such a contract is able, calmly and with 
deliberation, to select funeral arrangements within his 
means, secure in the knowledge tha.t his widow and family 
will not, under the pressure of deep grief, succumb to 
the very human tendency to provide a lavish funeral 
service and casket as an expression of their bereavement. 
The purchaser, moreover, is able to pay for all or part 
of the funeral costs in advance, and thus relieve his 
survivors of this substantial financial burden. 
Realistically speaking, a plan offering greater bene-
fits and services to a funeral purchaser and his surviv-
ors, \vith less risk of loss, \Yould be difficult indeed to 
concelVP. 
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POIN1T I 
THE LOWER CO·URT PRO~PERLY R1ULE:D T'H!AT A FUN-
ERAL DIRE'CTO,R OR EMBALMER WH·O PERFO·RMS SERV-
I~CE.S OR FURNISHE;S FACILITIES PURSUA.N1T TO· A PRE-
NEED CONTRACT PREVIOUSLY SOLI·CITED AND SOLD BY 
MEM~ORI:AL TRUS'DS I1S N·OT GUILTY OF UNETHICAL OR 
UN.PROFESSIO·NAL CO·ND:UCT WITHIN THE M~EANING 
OF SEICT'I'ONS 58-9-10 and 58-9-22, U.!C.A., 1953, AND THERE-
BY SUBJECT T10 REVQICATION OF LICENSE. 
U.'c·.A., 1953, Sections 58-9'-10 and 58-9'-22, related to 
unlawful solicitation by licensed funeral directors and em-
balmers, provide in pertinent part as follows : (All em-
phasis added.) 
58-9-10: "The words 'unprofessional con-
duct' as relating to embalming are hereby defined 
to include: 
* * * * 
(7) Solicitation of dead human bodies by a 
registered apprentice or licensed embalmer or 
their agents, assistants or employees, whether ~uch 
solicitation occurs before or afteT death * * * 
(8) Em:ployment directly or indirectly, of 
any apprent~ce, agent * * * or other person, on 
part or full time or on commission, for the pur-
pose of calling upon individuals or institutions 
by whose influence dead human bodies may be 
turned over to .a particular mortuary establ£sh-
ment, funeral director or embalmer; provided 
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this provision shall not be deemed to prevent and 
prohibit the solicitation for sale of crypts, burial 
lots or cremation services by a licensee or his 
employee. 
58-9-22: "/The words 'unprofessional cort-
duct' as they relate to this act are hereby defined 
to include. * * * 
(d) Employment by the licensee of persons 
known as 'capers' [cap·p·ers] or 'steerers' or 'soli-
citors' or other such persons to obtain funeral 
directing or embalming business. 
(e) Employment, directly or indirectly, of 
any apprentice, agent, assistant, embalmer, em-
ployee or other person, on part or full time, or on 
commission,. for the purpose of calling upon indi-
viduals or institutions by whose influence dead 
human bodies may be turned over to a particular 
funeral director * * * 
(f) The buying· of business by the licensee, 
his agents, assistants or employees, or the direct 
or indirect payment or offer of payment of a 
commission, bonus or gift by the licensee, his 
agents, assistants or employees for the purpose 
of securing business." 
These two sections of the Funeral Directors' Act 
were designed to eliminate the unse·emly race for dead 
human bodies and the many other flagrant abuses and 
fraudulent practices 'vhich 'vere once so widespread in the 
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unregulated climate of an earlier period. See S·ection 58-
9-13, which sets forth the policy of the law. To this end, 
these sections prohibit solicitation activity initiated by 
and for the direct benefit of a particular mortuary estab-
lishment, funeral director or embalmer, whether acting 
in person or through "agents, assistants or employees." 
Similarly they prohibit employment of persons to steer 
funeral business to them and the "buying of business" 
by a "licensee, his agents, assistants or employees" hy 
means of a ''direct or indirect payment or offer of pay-
ment of a commission, bonus or gift." 
The activities and practices proscribed by these sec-
tions are set forth clearly and in detail. And no reason-
able extension of the quoted language will support plain-
tiffs' contention that a person or firm which performs 
embalming or funeral services, under a pre-need contract 
solicited by Memorial Trusts, is guilty of conduct pro-
scribed as unprofessional by those sections of the law. 
Under the contract now sold by Memorial T'rusts the 
services contracted for are "to be performed by a Mor-
tuary selected by the Funeral Purchaser," provided Me-
morial Trusts is able to make firm arrangements with 
that mortuary "before the death of the Funeral Pur-
chaser." 
Under this contract Memorial ·Trusts does not act 
as an "agent, assistant or employee" of any "particular 
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mortuary establishment, funeral director or embalmer." 
'The mortuary used is seleeted by either the purchaser or 
his survivors, since the contract gives Memorial Trusts 
no right of mortuary selection. Once the selection is made, 
it then becomes the task of Memorial Trusts, "as agent 
for the Funeral Purchaser," to present the contract to the 
mortuary selected for its acceptance or rejection. How-
ever, in soliciting the contracts it acts as agent for itself 
only, it being at no time either employed, directed or 
controlled in any degree whatever by any mortuary, fun-
eral director or embahner. 
Such a contract, and the practices followed in it~ 
sale and performance, conform to the legislative policy 
found in Section 58-9-13 and provide a sensible, dignified 
and thrifty method by which to solve, in advance of need, 
the universal problem of a proper funeral at a proper 
pr1ce. 
If the Legislature had intended to prohibit sale of 
such contracts by organizations such as l\{emorial Trusts, 
it could easily have done so but, instead, the language em-
ployed in these statutes clearly li1nits their effect. 
1Significantly, plaintiffs' brief alleges no facts upon 
which it may properly be claimed that l\femorial Trusts 
has engaged in any conduct prohibited by the statutes., 
nor does the record in this case contain any factual basis 
for a finding that a mortuary \Yhich accepts and per-
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forms the obligations of a contract sold by Memorial 
Trusts has, by such acceptance and performance, violated 
the law. 
The contention, made at pages 14-16 of plaintiffs' 
brief, that when a mortuary agrees to perform as pro-
vided in a pre-need contract, the corporate defendant 
which sold the contract becomes the agent by ratification 
of the mortuary, cannot apply to the contract of Mem-
orial'Trusts. As the cases and authorities relied upon to 
support that contention readily show, they deal with 
the wholly dissimlar situation where acts are "professed 
to be done" on the principal's account by "one not assum-
ing to act for himself," but which acts the principal later 
ratifies. 
In contrast to the foregoing, the contract of Memor-
ialrT'rusts, as noted above, leaves the mortuary selection 
entirely in the hands of the purchaser and/ or his sur-
vivors, and reserves no such right to Memorial Trusts. 
The arrangements with the mortuary of the purchaser's 
choice are then made by Memorial 'T'rusts, not as agent 
of the mortuary, but, rather, "as agent for the Funeral 
Purchaser" (R. 19). 
Certainly the purchaser himself is permitted to con-
tact a mortuary of his choice and make such arrange-
ments in advance of need without violating the above 
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statutes related to unlawful solicitation. Similarly, these 
same arrangements are permitted to be made by the 
purchaser's agent whether it be his wife, his friend, his 
employee or Memorial ·Trusts. 
Memorial Trusts neither acts, nor assumes to act, 
nor has had authority to act as the agent of any mortu-
ary. It acts only on its own behalf and on behalf of 
persons who purchase its contracts. 
Unsupported allegations of mere legal conclusions 
may not be substituted for facts or evidence, especially 
where, as here, no attempt whatever was made by plain-
tiffs to introduce evidence in support of their reckless 
and unfounded suspicions of pre-existing agreements 
which did not in fact exist. The lower court properly 
ruled that it could not assume a violation of law merely 
because plaintiffs allege it, particularly where the alle-
gation is, as in paragraph 12 of plaintiffs' complaint~ 
base solely on belief and does not even reach the pre-
carious foundation of "information and belief," and the 
record itself sho"red a full compliance with applicable 
statutes. 
Plaintiffs' first ground of summary judgment, there-
fore, failed and was properly denied. 
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P'OINT II 
THE LOWER CO,URT PROPERLY RULED T'H,AT THE 
PRE-NEED ~cO·NTRAtCT OF MEMO·RIAL TRUSTS, ArS AT-
TACHED T10 I'T'S AN18W1E,R AS EXHI,BIT A, WHICH PER-
MITS MEM·ORIAL TRUSTS, AS REV·01CABLE AGENT 01F 
THE PAYOR, TO WITHDRAW EARNINGS FR:O,M 'TRUST 
DOES NOT VIOLATE 'THE PRO·VI,SIONS 0'F SECTION 22-
4-4, U.C.·A., 1953 (1963 ~Supp.) 
Section 2.2-4-4, U.1C.A., 1953 ( 1963 Supp.) governs 
withdrawal of entrusted funds and provides that: 
"All payments and amounts so deposited, with 
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be with-
drawn until the death of the sole or one of the 
beneficiaries, provided that said funds plus all 
interest and earnings shall be release,d to the 
payor originally paying sa~d funds under the 
purchase agreement, and said payor shall be en-
titled to receive the same or any part thereof, at 
any time prior to the death of any beneficiary, 
upon demand upon said bank or trust company, 
and upon surrender of any pass book evidencinrJ 
same." (Italicized portion was not quoted in ap-
pellants' brief, p. 19-20.) 
T'his statute does not require that the trust earnings 
"can't be withdrawn" as the plaintiffs claim, but rather 
that they may be released to the payor at any tin1e, on 
demand and surrender of the pass book. 
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T·here can be no doubt that under the above statute 
the right to control the earnings and interest of the trust 
rests in the contract purchaser-the payor. This being 
so, there can be no valid objection to the provision in 
paragraph IV of the contract of Memorial Ttusts, where-
in the payor 
". . . revocably appoints Memorial Tirusts, Inc., 
as agent to demand and receive earnings of the 
trust funds and to pay the same to itself in ex-
change for and in consideration of the agreement 
. . . to guarantee the services and facilities ... 
regardless of future price increases. 'The Funeral 
Purhaser agrees upon request to make such de-
mand personally and pay said earnings to ·Me-
morial T'rusts, Inc." (R. 19) (Emphasis added.) 
Nothing in the above statute nor in general law pro-
hibits such disposition of an indivdual's property right by 
him or under his direciton. Nor does any statute or 
principal prohibit a person from designating an agent 
to act on his behalf in the manner provided in this con-
tract. 
"Any person \vho is sui juris and has capa-
city to affect his legal relations by the giving of 
consent to a delegable act or transaction, may au-
thorize an agent to act for him with the same ef-
fect as if he \Yere to act in person." 3 Am. Jur. 
2d -l-24 (Agency, Section 9). 
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Where, as here, the appointment as agent extends 
only to the earnings of the trust (and not to withdrawal 
of "all funds, including earnings" as alleged by plaintiffs) 
and where such appointment can be revoked by the payor 
at any time, there is no possibility that the principal fund, 
out of which the services and faciilties provided by the 
contract are to be paid, will be dissipated or unavailable 
when required. 
If Section 22-4-4 were construed to prohibit or pre-
clude withdrawal of earnings in this manner, it would 
be unconstitutional as an unlawful prohibition of a law-
ful business under the guise of regulation and an unneces-
sary, arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the right 
of all persons to make contracts and deal with their 
own properties. The constitutional aspects of the Utah 
pre-need law, Sections 22-4-1 to 7, will be discussed more 
fully under Point IV, infra, but it is important here to 
recall that one of man's basic rights, under our system 
of freedom and law, is the right to acquire, usP and dis-
pose of property. As stated by the Supreme Court of 
Utah, in Ritholz v. Salt Lake City Corporation (1955 ), 
3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P. 2d 702: 
'.'·Clearly among the rights attendant upon 
ownership and enjoyment of property are the 
rights to exchange, pledge, sell or otherwise dis-
pose of it-rights which must be adequately pro-
tected." 
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It will be noted that in the brief of the defendant 
Commissioners, the Attorney ·General concedes that the 
Commissioners (after a thorough re·view of this question, 
following conferences with representatives of plaintiffs 
and of Memorial Trusts) concluded that it had no objec-
tion to the business activities, of Memorial Trusts in this 
respect. 
Plaintiffs again have alleged no fact upon which 
to ground their attack upon the contract of this defend-
ant. Again, merely to allege that a contract is improper 
does not make it so and plaintiffs' second demand for 
summary judgment was therefore properly denied. 
POINT III 
THE DOWER tCOURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
PRiE-NEED ·OONTR.A!GT O~F MEM·ORIAL TR,USTS IS NOT 
A CONTRA!GT O~F "INSURANCE," SO AS TO REQUIRE SUB-
MISSTO·N T'O AND COMPLIAN1CE WITH THE UTAH STAT-
UTEIS AND REGULATIO·NS WHICH APPLY TO· INSUR-
AN:OE CO,MP ANIES. 
Plaintiffs' contention that Memorial Trusts' pre-need 
funeral contract is a "contract of insurance," requiring 
Memorial'T'rusts to qualify as an insurance company, is 
not supported by either the statutory or the generally 
accepted definition or the basic concept of insurance and, 
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hence, cannot have the effect urged by plaintiffs. More-
over, as will be shown hereafter, the Utah pre-need 
funeral law itself negatives any such contention .. 
As is stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Helvertng v. LeGierse (1940), 312 U.S·. 531 at 539: 
"Historically and commonly insurance in-
volves risk-shifting and risk-distributing. !That life 
insurance is desirable from an economic and social 
standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk 
of loss from premature death is unquestionable. 
That these elements of risk-shifting and risk-dis-
tributing are essential to a life insurance contract 
is agreed by courts and commentators." 
'Typical of many state cases in which this same prin-
ciple has been restated and applied are In re Barr's 
Estate (Calif., 1951), 231 P. 2d 876; In re Smiley's Estate 
(Wash., 1950), 216 P. 2d 212, and South Georgia Funeral 
Homes, Inc. v. Harrison (Ga., 1936), 188 S.E. 529. In 
the latter case the court applied the principle of risk-
shifting and risk-distribution to pre-need funeral con-
tracts in the following terms : 
" ... The contract now being sold by the defend-
ant and by reason of the sale of which this con-
tempt proceeding arose, is one wherein the defend-
ant corporation, for a fixed and definite sum in 
hand paid or payable in installments, agrees to 
render and perform or cause to be rendered and 
performed for the purchaser or any one of his 
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family, certain funeral services ... While the 
performance of the contract is contingent upon 
death, this in and of itself does not make it a con-
tract of life insurance, nor does the fact that the 
fixed sum is payable in· installments. There is 
nothing in the contract itself nor is there any evi-
dence to show that the amount paid by a purchaser 
is less than the value of the funeral services con-
tracted to be performed, or that there is any 
element of risk involved, either on the part of the 
purchaser or the defendant corporation. The con-
tract on its face does not appear to be one of 
life insurance." 
The conclusions drawn above were referred to by 
Justice 1Crockett in his concurring opinion in In re Clark's 
Estate (Utah, 1960), 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112, in 
which he was joined by Justice McDonough. In that 
opinion he noted at page 118-119 that: 
" ... the important and controlling fact [is] 
that the financing institution, Equitable, incurred 
no risk of loss in the event of Mr. Clark's death. 
It was obliged to pay nothing except to refund 
the payments he has made ... plus interest there-
on .... From the facts above discussed it seems 
quite unmistakable that the contract ... does not 
have the characteristics to properly classify it 
as a contract for life insurance. 
" 'Insurance' is an agreement that, for a 
premiu1n it receives, the insurer will pay to the 
beneficiary a stated sum upon the happening of 
a contingency such as death or other loss. It 
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involves risk on the part of the insurer to pay 
on the happening of the contingency and the 
spreading of the risk over the group who pay 
the premiums. Or, as is sometimes stated, 'in-
surance involves risk-shifting .and risk-distrib-
uting.'" 
The concurring opinion concludes with this approv-
ing reference to a decision of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey (In Re Atkin's Estate 18 A.2·d 45) 1n an 
annuity case: 
"!The court placed emphasis on the fact that 
. the company assumed no risk of loss by 
reason of the premature death of the annuitant, 
and that its only risk was in case . . . [he·] lived 
longer than expected. It reasoned in accordance 
with the views exp-ressed above that because 
there was no risk-shifting or risk-distributing 
... but simply a return of the accumulated pay-
ments upon the death of the employee, that the 
fund was not life insurance. ·The Supreme Court 
of the United States similarly reasoned to the 
same conclusion in the case of Helvering v. Le-
Gierse." 
After the Clark case was decided, the Utah Legisla-
ture, in 1963, changed the definition of "insurance" to 
include the conc~pt . of "risk." Formerly, the statute 
provided that insurance was " ... a contract whereby 
one undertakes to pay indemnity or pay a specified 
amount upon determinable contingencies," but the 1963 
amendment added the word "risk" to the last phrase, 
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so it now reads ". . . upon determinable risk contin-
gencies," S·ection 31-1-7, u~c·.A., 19~53, (1963, Supp.). 
( E·mphasis added.) 
·The addition of the word "risk" to the statute, 
which plaintiffs have completely overlooked in their 
brief, makes even more compelling the conclusion that 
the risk features must be present in any contract for it 
to constitute insurance. 
Applying the principle of the autl1orities above 
cited to the contract issued by Memorial ·T-rusts, it is ap-
parent that it cannot he properly classified as insurance. 
The following features of that contract are particularly 
illustrative of the point : 
1. The contract price to be paid by the purchaser, 
although payable in installments if the purchaser chooses, 
is, nonetheless, fixed in amount. In the event any bal-
ance on the contract remains unpaid at the death of 
the purchaser or the person for ·w·hom the services are 
to be perfor1ned, the services contracted for will be 
performed only "upon payment of the balance remain-
ing due" or upon "supplemental arrangements" being 
made for such paYJ.nent. Thus, the contract contains 
no ~'forgiveness" feature whereby 1\Jfemorial Trusts as 
sumes a risk of incomplete pay1nent because of prema-
ture death. The amount due l\femorial T·rusts under 
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each contract, either from the purchaser, his estate or 
from others, is fixed when the contract is entered into 
just as with any installment contract. 
2. The contract is fully revocable, at any time while 
it is in effect, at the opinion of the purchaser, in which 
event all amounts paid by him under the contract must 
be refunded to him. 
3. 'The contract requires 1Iemorial Trusts to place 
in trust all funds received from the purchaser, it being 
entitled to no solicitation expenses or commissions of any 
kind whatever from that fund until the services contract-
ed for have been performed. In the meantime, the earn-
ings received from the trust constitute the compensation 
to Memorial T'rusts for guaranteeing the services re-
gardless of future p·rice increases. 
'Thus, insofar as Memorial Trusts is concerned, 
each individual contract stands on its own so that all 
services offered by Memorial Trusts at any given time 
are equally available to any would-be purchaser at the 
same prices, regardless of the age, condition of health, 
financial status or moral qualifications of the purchaser 
or the person for whom the services are to be furnished. 
In this conection it is important to note that Memorial 
Trusts neither uses nor has need to use mortality tables, 
risk percentage calculations, physical examinations or 
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signed health application forms which are so common 
in the insurance field. Instead, the same serVIces are 
available to all take-rs at the same prices. 
4. By virtue of Section 22-4-5, "any balance remain-
ing not otherwise disposed of ... in payment for mer-
chandise or services" as provided in the pre-need contract 
" ... shall revert to and inure to the benefit of the estate 
of said decease·d payor .... "thus precluding any possible 
"risk" as to the amount of gain, if any, on even that 
possible small surplus. 
When and if the contract matures, Memorial T;rusts 
is entitled to its commission and profit, and in the mean-
time, for so long as the contract remains in force, M.em-
orial 'TTusts is entitled to the earnings from the trust .. 
·T·herefore, it makes no difference as to any contract 
whether death comes early or late. These contracts 
contain none of the risk-shifting or risk-distributing 
features of insurance contracts. Each is a separate, self-
contained unit with no risk ties to any othe-r. 
·The cases and authorities cited in plaintiffs' brief 
as supporting their contention that pre-need contracts 
constitute insurance are not applicable to the contract 
of Memorial'Trusts. Each of those cases and authorities 
either deals with a situation in which the risk-distribut-
ing, risk-shifting features are clearly present or they 
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rely upon cases in which those elements were dominant. 
None of them have analyzed in detail nor involved a 
contract such as that sold by ~1emorial Trusts. 
Apparently the most recent case to decide this 
question is Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens (Ida-
ho), 397 P.2d 34, decided November 25, 19'64. In that 
case the contracts under challenge permitted the pur-
chaser to have any balance of the purchase price which 
remained unpaid upon his death paid from proceeds of 
credit life insurance, but only until the purchaser reached 
65 years of age and only so long as he remained in "good 
health." ·The contract also obligated the seller to provide 
an interment space for any of the purchaser's four 
grandchildren in the event they died before reaching age 
21. 
The statutory definition of insurance in Idaho, Idaho 
Code Section 41-102, is identical to S·ection 31-1-7, U.'C.A. 
1953 (1963 Supp.). 
Notwithstanding these provisions in that contract 
which distinguish it from and which make it more like 
insurance than, the contracts sold by Memorial 'Trusts, 
the Idaho court held, in a majority opinion by Justice 
McFadden, that the contract was not a contract of in-
surance but, rather, a contract for the purchase of ser-
vices and merchandise, with delivery postponed until 
after death. The court there, in so ruling, carefully out-
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lined the features which distinguish a contract of in-
surance and noted, as we have above, that the cases and 
authorities in which pre-need contracts have been held 
to be insurance are distinguishable from the facts of the 
present case which do not involve the elements of risk-
shifting and risk-distributing. 
Quite apart from the foregoing, the conclusion that 
these contracts do not constitute insurance is compelled 
by the pre-need funeral law itself. It will be noted that 
in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, this Court 
is requested to declare that ~ny: 
" ... pre-need contract which guarantees fun-
eral services at a future date at a set price regard-
less of increase or deerease in price is an insur-
ance contract." (R. 32) 
This request must be compared with the language 
of Section 22-4-1 ( 1963 Supp.) which sets out the scope 
of activities which are governed by the Utah pre-need 
funeral law as follows : 
" ... any payment of money made to any 
person, firm or corporation upon any agreement 
or contract . . . which has for a purpose the 
furnishing or performance of funeral services, 
under a pre-arranged funeral plan ... for future 
use at a time determinable by the death of the 
person or persons for "\vhose benefit any such 
agreement has been made ... shall be held to be 
trust funds .... " 
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and their receipt, deposit and use are governed by the 
remaining provisions of Chapter 4, 1Title 22. 
As is readily apparent from the quoted excerpts, 
the plaintiffs seek to have regulated as "insurance" all 
of the plans, persons and practices which are necessarily 
already included within the scope of the pre-need fune-ral 
law. However, there is no need and no reason for qual-
ification under, and compliance with, both the pre-need 
law and the insurance code at the same time. In recog-
nition of this fact Section 22-4"""6 ( 1963 Supp.) of the pre-
need law provides : 
"!This act shall not apply to or affect the 
operations and business of duly licensed associa-
tions or companies under the insurance laws of 
the state of Utah." 
Were all pre-need funeral contracts to be treated as 
insurance contracts and required to comply with the 
State Insurance ~Code, as the plaintiffs so strongly 
contend, the pre-need law itself would be rendered mean-
ingless because there would remain nothing to which it 
would apply, in view of the exclusion contained in Sec-
tion 22-4-6 for duly licensed insurance companies and 
associations. This simply cannot have been the intent 
of the Legislature, which went to the trouble of enacting 
a special law for a special kind of contract. 
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Under the construction urged by Memorial 'Trusts, 
only true insurance companies which have complied with 
the insurance code and which coincidentally deal in some 
fashion with pre-need funeral plans and arrangements 
would be excluded from the operation of the pre-need 
funeral law. ,c·ompliance with the insurance laws as an 
insurer is sufficient protection of the public interest 
without requiring compliance with the pre-need law in 
addition. :This arrangement leaves the great majority 
of pre-need funeral contracts fully regulated under the 
pre-need funeral law, as they should he and as the 
L·egislature obviously intended them to be. 
1THE LO·WER COURT PRO!PERLY RULED THAT CER-
TAIN POR:TTONS OF 8EiCTIO·NS 22-4-1 TO 6 AND ALL 
OF SECTI01N 7, U.'C.A. 1953 (19'63 SUPPLEMENT), ARE 
UNiGONSTITIONAL UNDER THE UNIT'ED STATES 
OONSTITUTIO·N OR THE ·CONSTIT'UTION O·F UTAH. 
'The Utah pre-need funeral law, Section 22-4-1 to 
7, U.C.A. 1953 (196.3 Supp.), when considered as a whole 
is unconstitutional in that it: 
(1) makes every "person who violates any 
provision" of the act guilty of a criminal violation 
and subject to criminal penalties, without at the 
same tilne giving notice or otherwise informing 
those subject to the act what conduct on their part 
renders them liable to its penalties; 
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(2) singles out and discriminates against a 
particular lawful business, thereby denying equal 
protection of the laws to Memorial :Tirusts and 
others similarly situated; and 
(3) imposes unnecessary arbitrary and un-
reasonable prohibitory restrictions upon lawful 
private business transactions under the guise of 
regulation in the puhlic interest. 
These deficiencies will be discussed In the above 
order. 
(1) Contained within the seven sections of the pre-
need law are literally dozens of requirements with which 
the persons named in the act must comply. To impose 
punishment upon any person who violates "any provi-
sion" of the act, whether willful or not, and without re-
gard to the nature or purpose of the violation, is violative 
of due process. For example, suppose the trustee should 
fail to furnish all "information required by the director" 
(Section 22-4-3) or, through oversight, omit a date or 
an amount on a required report? Are such acts and 
omissions crimes~ How is a reasonable man to distin-
guish between criminal and non-criminal violations? 
A smilar situation was before the ·Colorado Supre1ne 
Court in Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery ('C.olo. 1960), 
356 P.2d 884, wherein a similar statute was declared to 
be unconstiutional for vagueness. In that case, as in the 
present one, "violations of the act (were) ... made pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment." 
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The court in that case stated at p. 888 : 
"'T'he test to which the statute in question 
must be subjected under this record is made clear 
by the ~Supreme 1C'ourt of the United ·States in the 
case of 'Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
u.s. 385 .... 
'That the terms of a penal statute creat-
ing a new offense must be sufficiently explicit 
to inform those who are subject to it what 
conduct on their part will render them liable 
to its penalties is a well-recognized require-
ment, consonant alike with ordinary notions 
of fair play and the settled rules of law, and 
a statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application 
violates the first essential of due process of 
law." 
"·T'he statute in the particulars hereinabove 
mentioned is violative of due process and is uncon-
stitutional (under the United States and Colorado 
~Constitutions)." 
The same test is reiterated by the Supreme 'Court of 
the United States in the recent case of Baggett v. Bullitt 
( 1964) ______ U.S. ______ , 12 L.Ed.2d 377. 
In State v. Musser (Utah 1950), 118 Utah 537, 223 
P.2d 193, the Utal1 Supren1e Court voided and held un-
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constitutionally vague a statute which made it a criminal 
offense for two or more persons to conspire "to commit 
any act injurious . . . to public morals. . . ." And in 
State v. Packard (Utah 1952), 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2·d 
561 the ,c·ourt held unconstitutional a statute which 
' prescribed criminal penalties for failure to register with 
the Industrial~Commission before "commencing employ-
ment with any person, firm or corporation whose em-
ployees are out on a labor strike called by a national 
recognized union." In that case the Utah court set out 
the standards which a statute must meet to withstand 
an attack on the ground that it is vague and uncertain. 
"The limitations of language are such that 
neither absolute exactitude of expression nor com-
plete precision of meaning are to be expected, 
and such standard cannot be required. On the 
other hand there is no disagreement among the 
courts that where a rule is set up, the violation 
of which subjects one to criminal punishment, the 
restrictions upon conduct should be prescribed 
with sufficient certainty, so that persons of or-
dinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may 
know how to govern themselves in conformity with 
it, and that no one should be compelled at the 
peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as 
to the meaning of penal statutes. 
"'Concerning the question of uncertainty or 
vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be 
in accord with the test a statute ntust need to be 
valid is : It must be sufficiently definite (a) to 
inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would 
be law abiding, "\vhat their conduct must be to 
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conform to its requirements ; (b) to advise- a 
defendant accused of violating it just what consti-
tutes the offense with which he is charged, and 
(c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation 
and application by those charged with respon-
sibility of applying and enforcing it." 
It is submitted that the pre-need law, insofar as it 
prescribes criminal penalties for violations of its terms, 
meets none of the tests set forth in the Packard case. 
The act states that any person who violates "any pro-
vision'' of the act is guilty of a criminal offense. Yet 
the act requires, as to each and every pre-need contract 
that comes within its terms, compliance with a complex 
system which involves entrusting of funds and submis-
sion of reports within prescribed periods of time over 
the entire life of the contract which may encompass many 
years' time. As to reports, there is no determinable limit 
upon the phrase "all information required by the direc-
tor.'' 
Certainly no one would argue that every single act, 
duty and responsibility involved in this complicated 
scheme, such as dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's 
in the required reports might subject a person to the 
criminal penalty unless done correctly, on time and to 
the extent and "rith the detail required by the director, 
whose requirements n1ight change as often as men change 
their 1ninds. If such ''rere the ease, the statute would sure-
ly be deelared void as an unreasonable exercise of the 
pollee po\\'"Pr. \"" <:)t the statute dra"\\'"S no line e~cluding 
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these insignificant acts or omissions from its operation or 
defining the nature and extent of the information which 
a direetor might require. No person governed by the 
statute can act, except at his peril, if the p·enalty pro-
vision is to be uniformly enforced. Moreover, no person 
charged with its enforcement could possibly give it uni-
form interpretation and application. As the United 
States Supreme ;Court stated in Manley v. The State of 
Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 73 L.E·d. 575, 578 in striking down 
as unconstitutional a statute which provided criminal 
penalties for certain conduct of officers of a bank, "the 
statute does not specify the elements of the offense." 
In contrast, to the Utah provision, the Idaho statute, 
Idaho Code Section 54-1120, upheld in Messerli v. Mon-
arch Memory Gardens, Inc., supra, provides that only 
"willful'' violations of the act are criminal offenses. 
(2) It is a well-established principle of law that 
a lawful business may not be unreasonably singled out 
for unduly stringent or oppressive restriction under the 
guise of regulation without violating the state and federal 
constitutional provisions which guarantee equal pro-
tection of the laws. !Thus in State v. Memorial Gardens 
Development Corp. (W. Va. 1957), 101 S·.E. 2d 425, 68 
A.L.R. 2d 1233, the court heid unconstitutional and void 
as singling out and discriminating against an other\vi HP 
lawful business and as discriminating between kinds 
and classes of businesses, a statute very similar to tht' 
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Utah pre-need law with which the present case is con-
cerned. That statute required that all funds collected 
upon pre-need burial contracts be deposited in trust 
accounts for the benefit of policyholders and withdrawn 
only upon the death or demand of the purchaser, with 
the result that no money was available to the trustor 
for operating expense or profit. !The court noted that: 
"Many frauds are perpetrated in daily busi-
ness transactions and redress therefor is civilly 
and criminally available to the victim. But fraud 
is not necessarily or reasonably imputable to 
the business of selling personal property or agree-
ing to perform services whether at present or 
in the future. If such were the law, every mer-
chant could be regulated in the simple sale of his 
goods. . . . While it may be true that the defen-
dant's business is not that simple, yet the quantity 
or extent of business conducted or the time of 
performance element should not be the criterion 
by which legality is determined." 
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated in W allberg 
v. Utah Public Welfare C-ommission (Utah, 1949), 115 
Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935, 940: 
"/The law is well established that the legisla-
ture has authority, within constitutional limita-
tions, to make classifications when and only when 
the classifications rests upon some ground of dif-
ference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the subject of the legislation. 
* * * 
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"iTo be unconstitutional, the discrimination 
must be unreasonable and arbitrary." 
As is pointed out in the Memorial Gardens case, 
supra, there is no reasonable basis upon which the op-
pressive control and regulation imposed by the Utah 
pre-need law can be justifiably imposed upon pre-need 
funeral contracts when no other similar merchandising 
activity is subjected to such a stifling degree of control. 
The furnishing of funeral services is as old as civiliza-
tion and as necessary as life itself. ~There is no rational 
basis upon which the activity of providing payment for 
those services in advance of need should be single·d out 
and so severely restricted. 
(3) ·The most serious constitutional violation per-
petrated by the pre-need law is its unreasonable and ar-
bitrary restriction of a lawful business, amounting to a 
prohibition, under the guise of regulation in the public 
interest. The distinction between illegal prohibition of 
a business and its lawful regulation in the public interest 
has been clearly pointed out in numerous cases, including 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the 
Supreme 1Court of Utah. As these cases show, the re-
strictions contained within the Utah pre-need law amount 
to an unconstitutional prohibition of the sale of pre-
need contracts rather than their lawful regulation. 
In New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann (1932), 285 U.S. 
261, 76~L~.Ed. 747, it is stated: 
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''Plainly, a regulation which has the effect 
of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common 
right to engage in a lawful private business, such 
as that under review, cannot be upheld consistent 
with the 14th Amendment. Under that amend-
ment, nothing is more clearly settled than that 
it is beyond the poweT of a state, 'under the guise 
of protecting the public, arbitrarily [to] interfere 
with private business or prohibit lawful occupa-
tions or impose unreasonable and unnecessary 
restrictions upon the·m.' " 
" ... the principle is embedded in our consti-
tutional system that there are certain essentials 
of liberty with which the state is not entitled to 
dispense in the interest of experiments." 
Similarly, in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial 
Relations (1924), 267 U.S·. 550, 69 L.Ed. 785, the Court ob-
served: 
" ... While there is no sueh thing as absolute 
freedom of contract, and it is subject to a variety 
of· restraints, they must not be arbitrary or un-
reasonable. Freedom is the general rule and re-
straint the exception. The legislative authority 
to abridge can be justified only in exceptional 
circumstances. . . ." ''The established doctrine is 
that this liberty (of contract and right of prop-
erty) may not be interfered \vith under the guise 
of protecting the public interest, by legislative 
action \Yhich is arbitrary or \vithout reasonable 
relation to some purpose \Vithin the co1npetency 
of the state to effect.' ,, 
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In Baltimore and O.S.W.R. Company v. Voigt (1899), 
176 U.S. 498, 44 L.Ed. 560, the court quoted a leading 
English case as follows : 
·"It must not be forgotten that you are not 
to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that 
a given contract is void as being against pulic 
policy, because if there is one thing which more 
than another public policy requires it is that 
men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred, shall be en-
forced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have 
this paramount public policy to consider - you 
are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of 
contract." 
The same court said in Adams v. Tarnner (1916), 
244 U.S. 590, 61 L.Ed. 1336: 
"
1C·ertainly there is no profession, possibly 
no business, which does not proffer peculair op-
portunities for reprehensible practices; and as to 
every one of them, no doubt, some can be found 
quite ready earnestly to maintain that its sup-
pression would be in the public interest. Skill-
fully directed agitation might also bring about 
apparent condemnation of any one of them by 
the public. Happily for all, the fundamental 
guarantees of the constitution cannot be freely 
submerged if and whenever sorne ostensible 
justification is advanced and the police power in-
vakeel." 
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And, it is stated in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 
418, 171 L.Ed. 718: 
"It is not permissible to enact a law which in 
effect spreads an all-inclusive net for the feet of 
everybody upon the chance that, while the in-
nocent will surely he entangled in its meshes, 
some wrong-doers also may be caught." 
T'he above principle-s were recognized by the Su-
preme 1Court of Utah in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake 
(Utah, 1956), 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 at 706, where-
in an ordinance which prohibited advertising of the 
prices of eyeglasses was held unconstitutional. ·The 
court said: 
"It should be noted that the law cannot be made, 
nor could one be enforced, which would entirely 
protect the completely naive and gullible. In 
any event, if a customer desires to use ordinary 
care, adequate protection is afforded. ... 
"'There are also other considerations to be 
taken into account as against the contention made 
by the city that the ordinance would tend to insure 
better quality of eyeglasses and conserve public 
health. One of these is that the basic theory un-
derlying our system of government, its laws and 
our entire social system, is that all persons shall 
enjoy the highest possible degree of individual 
freedom consistent with the same de·gree of liberty 
in others, which theory this restriction upon plain-
tiffs' business runs counter to. Another is the 
effect which free competition ... has upon busi-
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ness. Such freedom in competition has proved 
very beneficial to our economy and our standard 
of living. Its stimulus has resulted in p·roducing 
ever more efficient methods by which the Ameri-
can people have been furnished more and better 
services and higher quality merchandise. ·They 
have proved themselves sufficiently good judges 
of the quality of products that those who excel 
in furnishing superior ones succeed and continue 
to improve, while others fail. 
'·';The very element of competition through 
price advertising may well have beneficial effects 
upon the quality of the product sold which would 
offset any possible slight detriment to health that 
may be hazarded if such advertising were cur-
tailed. . . . We are of the opinion that it (the 
ordinance) does not have any such substantial 
bearing on public health as to justify this extension 
of the police power into the regulation of private 
business and the violation of the right to freely 
advertise and sell one's property. We do not 
believe that the constitutional rights involved 
should be swept away on any such tenuous ground 
... the evil sought to be corrected by the ordinance 
is a business evil. The ordinance has no relation 
to public health and is an unlawful interference 
with private business. It is also parallel with the 
principle espoused by this Court in the case of 
Salt Lake City v. Revene, in which we deerePrl the 
ordinance fixing opening and closing hours of 
barber shops to have no substantial relationship 
to public health .... " 
In State v. M emoria.Z Gardens Development Corp., 
cited supra, a statute nearly identical to the Utah pre-
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need law was declared to be unconstitutional as being 
prohibitory rather than regulatory, the court there stat-
Ing: 
Although plaintiff claims that the public deal-
ing with defendant could be defrauded, such pos-
sibility should not destroy the right to contract. 
Fear or suspicion that one will commit fraud or 
resort to fraudulent practices can be leveled at 
any one at any time engaged in any lawful busi-
ness, but we hardly see where that should be the 
basis for either regulation or prohibition of legit-
imate business. :The state cannot possibly protect 
all its citizens against possible loss on contracts 
which parties make. 
* * * 
·"The statute here involved which requires 
impounding of all purchase money has prohib-
itory rather than regulatory effect, because no 
one could without other types of business or fi-
nances afford to engage in such business which 
allowed no expenditure of the funds for opera-
tional expenses." 
Similarly, in State v. Gateway ~f ortuaries (l\1ont. 
1930), 287 Pac. 156,. the court held void and unconstitu-
tional a statute which prohibited written contracts for 
personal services in connection \Vi th burial of human 
bodies, when not 1nade in contemplation of immediate 
death. ~The court noted that the mere possibility of 
fraud was insufficient ground for prohibiting a la\Yful 
business. Said the court: 
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"The moving impulse is not to regulate busi-
ness; it is to prohibit written contracts relating 
to the very essentials of the business, except under 
circumsta.nces practically prohibitive . .. to the 
general rwn of mankind." (Emphasis added.) 
Although the Utah Legislature, by enacting the pre-
need law, seemingly declared pre-need contracts to be 
legitimate and useful, nevertheless it condemned them 
by the oppressive and unreasonable control to which 
it subjected them. In this respect the Utah pre-ne·ed law 
is similar to that stricken down as an unconstitutional 
prohibition in Gardon Spot Market, Inc. ·v. Byrne (Mont., 
1962), 378 P.2d 220. 
As pointed out above, there is no inherent charac-
teristic of pre~need funeral contracts which makes them 
more subject to fraud or overreaching than numerous 
other merchandising enterprises. Yet these contracts 
are subjected to far more stringent controls than are 
imposed upon any other merchandising activity in 1Ttah. 
Especially restrictive is the requirement that all funds 
paid on such contracts, including· all commissions and 
profit to the seller, be placed in trust until the death 
of the purchaser, which in many cases does not occur 
until many years after the contract becomes operative. 
Simimlarly restrictive is the provision which permits the· 
purchaser to withdraw impounded trust funds at any 
time without paying any of the expense of administration 
of sales. 
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:These restrictions, in practical effect, serve to pro-
hibit the selling of these contracts except by persons and 
concerns with large reserves and, even then, only under 
great financial handicap. And the addition of the all-
inclusive penalty provision makes this activity even yet 
more prohibitory and precarious. 
The extent to which the Utah pre-need law circum-
scribes and prohibits a person from dealing with and 
disposing of his own property becomes apparent when 
it is realized that is absolutely and categorically pro-
hibits a person from making a present, binding commit-
ment of his own money for the future disposition of his 
own body. Thus, a person is unable under the act to 
set aside out of his own reach and the reach of his 
creditors even a small amount of his present income or 
savings to provide for a decent burial when he dies, so 
as to avoid having to depend upon charity or upon sur-
viving relatives in the event financial reverses or ill 
health deplete his assets before his death. By the terms 
of. the statute all sums paid by him, though in trust, 
belong to him and can be withdrawn by him at any time. 
T·he act creates a simple debtor-creditor relationship 
between the purchaser and the bank and the seller has 
no claim upon the money until the purchaser's death. 
Thus the purchaser is not immune from the vicissitudes 
of fortune which may require that he take out and use 
the resources which are available to him. And, so long 
as he is able to reach the funds \Vithout restriction they 
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are also subject to being taken away by his creditors. 
Indeed, even a transfer to his son upon the son's promise 
to use the funds for the father's burial would fall within 
the scope and control of the Utah pre-need law so as 
to require the son to entrust all sums so received and, at 
the same time, subject them to the tides of fortune and 
health as noted above. Certainly this degree of control 
cannot be justified on the pretext of "protecting" the 
citizens' best interests. 
If the Utah pre-need law is considered as a whole, 
and its many restrictive features carefully analyzed, 
it becomes apparent that it was conceived and initiated 
by established concerns of which plaintiffs are repre .. 
sentatives, who were and are interested in perpetuating 
existing conditions which permit them to exercise a 
virtual monopoly over the funeral business in Utah with 
out fear of competition from concerns such as Memorial 
T'rusts which seek to offe-r the purchaser a valuable 
service at reasonable prices. 
Because of the severe restrictions imposed by th<~ 
pre-need law, numerous persons, who would otherwisP 
be able to plan their funeral needs and pay for them over 
a period of time in an atmosphere conducive to rational 
deliberation, are required instead to pass these problP1ns 
on to their survivors who, under the influence of grj pf 
and the pressure of time, cannot calmly and quietly select 
those funeral arrangements which they can afford. 
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Instead, while in deepest mourning and in profound 
shock, they agree to pay sums far beyond their means, 
in a vain effort to compensate in death for what they may 
have failed to provide the deceased in life. In this, they 
are smoothly supported by the expensive suggestions 
of the sympathetic and knowledgable funeral director, 
whose gentle pressure results in contracts for services 
and merchandise far beyond the means and budget 
of the bereaved. 
Such practices have furnished the basis for numer-
ous recent magazine articles and books. An authoritative 
survey and analysis of the problem, in which the prev-
alence of the practice is discussed at some length, is 
contained in the May, 1963 Stanford Law Review, page 
425, with the article: "Pre-Arrangement: Mitigating the 
Undertaker's Bargaining Advantage." 
CONCLUSIO·N 
'T·he contracts and practices of Memorial Trusts 
conform to the law and no one who accepts and performs 
such contracts is guilty of improper conduct. 
Memorial ·T'rusts is not in the insurance business and 
1s not required to be regulated as an insurer, since its. 
contract does not contain the statutory or decisional 
elements of insurance .. 
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The pre-need concept is a valuable development in 
a business and profession which all must inevitably 
patronize. ·This development, however, is being slowly 
and effectively strangled in its infancy by an arbitrary, 
vague and unconstitutional enactment of the Utah Leg-
islature- the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan L~aw. 
It is therefore clear that plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment was properly denied by the lower court 
and this Court should declare unconstitutional and void 
those portions of the Utah pre-need law, Sections 22-4.-1 
to 7, U.C.A., (1963 Supp.) which provide: (All empha-
sis added.) 
1. (Section 22-4-1) "Any payment of money 
made to any person ... for ... the furnishing or 
performance of funeral services, under a pre-
arranged funeral plan, or the furnishing or de-
livery of awy personal property, merchandise or 
services of any nature ... in connection with the 
final disposition of a dead human body, for 
future use ... shall be held to be trust funds .... " 
2. (Section 22-4-2) "All such trust funds shall 
be deposited in the name of the trustee, as trustee 
... and shall be held in trust, subject to the pro-
visions of this act." 
. 3. (Section 22-4-3) "All such reports ( re-
quired by the act) shall set forth in detail the 
information contained in the records required 
~o be kept by the trustee aforesaid, plus any other 
Information required by the director. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
4. (S.ection 22-4-4) "All payments and 
amounts so deposited, with all earnings and in-
terest thereon, shall not be withdrawn ... pro-
vided that said funds plus all interest and earn-
ings shall be released to the payor originally pay-
ing said funds ... at any time prior to the death 
of any beneficiary upon demand upon said bank 
or trust company .... n 
5. All of S·ection 22-4-7. 
By so doing, Memorial ·T'rusts and other reputable 
concerns will be able to provide a sensible pre-need plan 
for the public while at the same time putting an end 
to the undesirable practices which plaintiffs in their 
selfish interest, seek to perpetuate by this suit. 
Respectfully submitt~d, 
JO~HN H. SNO·W 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake 1City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Memorial Trusts, Inc. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
